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The sense of agency (SoA) (i.e., the registration that I am the initiator and controller of my
actions and relevant events) is associated with several affective dimensions. This makes
it surprising that the emotion factor has been largely neglected in the field of agency
research. Current empirical investigations of the SoA mainly focus on sensorimotor signals
(i.e., efference copy) and cognitive cues (i.e., intentions, beliefs) and on how they are
integrated. Here we argue that this picture is not sufficient to explain agency experience,
since agency and emotions constantly interact in our daily life by several ways. Reviewing
first recent empirical evidence, we show that self-action perception is in fact modulated
by the affective valence of outcomes already at the sensorimotor level. We hypothesize
that the “affective coding” between agency and action outcomes plays an essential role
in agency processing, i.e., the prospective, immediate or retrospective shaping of agency
representations by affective components. This affective coding of agency be differentially
altered in various neuropsychiatric diseases (e.g., schizophrenia vs. depression), thus
helping to explain the dysfunctions and content of agency experiences in these diseases.
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INTRODUCTION
The close relations between emotions and actions are ubiquitous
during our active engagement with the world. Emotions are the
force initiating and guiding behavior by making people act in
certain ways in order to achieve or avoid significant outcomes,
and actions in turn change how we are feeling and give rise to
particular emotional states. If a person feels in control over her
own body or the environment she may experience affective states
of pride or guilt, and vice versa, a context of helplessness and
depression may alter her predictions and perception of actions
and outcomes. It is therefore surprising that the affective dimen-
sions and components of actions have not been taken into the
equations of current models of the sense of agency (SoA), i.e.,
of the registration that I am the initiator of my actions and
related events (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 2008a,b). The
affective dimensions provide the basis for the evaluation of self-
controlled actions attributed to one’s own agency, leading–for
example–to feelings of personal capacity, self-esteem or relevant
self-conscious emotions such as guilt, shame, pride, and embar-
rassment. Moreover, the affective components of our actions
(e.g., affective dispositional state of the individual, affective social
context, affective value of the action outcome) modulate our
inclination to accept our action consequences and outcomes as
caused by ourselves or not.
Here our goal is to explore from an affective perspective, what
shapes our SoA. Current empirical and theoretical advances in
understanding agentive self-awareness from an affective point of
view will be discussed in order to stimulate future research and to
suggest a necessary extension of current conceptual frameworks
of agency to include the affective dimension of action. First,
we briefly review recent views suggesting a tight link between
emotion, action representation and self-awareness. Second, we
provide a review of existing studies explicitly addressing affective
influences on the SoA. Third, we discuss different affective deter-
minants and distinguish possible mechanisms underlying the
emotion-agency link, introducing the novel concept of “affective
coding” of agency which might occur prospectively, immediately
or retrospectively (post-hoc). The implications of this affective
perspective for our understanding of relevant agency disorders
will be discussed. We hypothesize that in particular the “affective
coding” between agency and action outcomes might play a crucial
role in agency processing both in health and disease.
THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN ACTION REPRESENTATION AND
SELF-AWARENESS
Recent evidence in cognitive neurosciences suggests that action
representation is strongly influenced by emotions and that sev-
eral brain structures are operating in networks to integrate
affectively significant signals with action cognition and rele-
vant behavioral control processes (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010).
The general idea of a direct link between perceptual states
and action representation is most familiar from common cod-
ing theory in cognitive psychology (Hommel et al., 2001)
claiming that actions are represented according to their per-
ceptual consequences. This theoretical approach has been fur-
ther extended to include affective codes as being part of these
action representations and essentially shaping them (Krebs et al.,
2010; Eder et al., 2012). It has been shown, for example,
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that learning of action-effect associations can be modulated
by the motivational value of an action during the acquisi-
tion phase and the motivational disposition of an individual
(Muhle-Karbe and Krebs, 2012). It is worth noting, however,
that goal representations associated with motivational states
compared to the hedonic experience of the outcome itself
might involve dissociable mechanisms and influences on action
representations.
Self-awareness in general has frequently been linked to the
processing of emotions and bodily states. Affective accounts of
selfhood assume that basic pre-reflective forms of self-awareness
are grounded in representations of emotions and bodily sensa-
tions (Damasio, 1999). This view has recently been formalized
within a computational framework of “predictive processing”
that links action, sensory perception and interoception (Seth
et al., 2011). According to this model of “interoceptive infer-
ence”, emotion and embodied self-awareness arise from generative
models predicting interoceptive signals that result as a conse-
quence of internal autonomic control signals or environmental
changes. Agency is considered to be one important predictor
of changes in internal bodily states that generate interoceptive
signals, for example an increase in heart rate when performing
or preparing for a personally challenging action. These prediction
signals are thought to give rise to a basic sense of presence
and agentive awareness (Seth et al., 2012). That means that,
action perception and attribution is thought to be determined not
only by exteroceptive and proprioceptive cues but also by their
close interplay with interoceptive bodily signals. This multi-cue
integration is at the core of an increasingly influential account
of agentive self-awareness, the multifactorial weighting account
(Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2013; Vosgerau and Synofzik, 2012). Mul-
tiple probabilistic cues are thought to be weighted as a function
of their predictive accuracy for prospective agency and integrated
with action-related signals based on their reliability and salience
during action execution and during retrospective processing of
the action. Important explanatory gaps still remain, though,
with respect to the exact mechanisms of how precisely emo-
tional states may interact with probabilistic and action-related
signals to inform feelings and judgments of agency at different
levels.
Besides cognitive approaches to self-awareness, a strong moti-
vational and emotional dimension of self-processing has been
posited in psychology (Leary, 2007). A number of “self-motives”
such as motives for self-enhancement, self-verification, self-
expansion, or self-assessment are thought to affect action and cog-
nition, and have been argued to function to protect people’s social
well-being. These “self-motives” are thought to be strongly linked
to different “self-conscious emotions”–including guilt, shame,
embarrassment, social anxiety and pride–that emerge from self-
representation (Leary, 2007). Experimental studies have shown
that although people may prefer objective, accurate information
about themselves under certain circumstances, the desire for self-
enhancement or verification of pre-existing self-conceptions may
override this motive (Sedikides and Strube, 1995). In line with
this view, it is well known that our mind has developed ways to
maintain the integrity of a positive self-concept even in contexts
of failure (Mezulis et al., 2004). Ample evidence indicates the
tendency in healthy individuals to make self-serving attributions
by relating positive outcomes to the self and negative outcomes
to others. This affective shaping of outcome attributions can
be altered in different neuropsychiatric diseases; for example, it
seems to be lacking in depression (Alloy and Abramson, 1979).
These findings can already be taken as first evidence for that
fact that the selection of new self-relevant information might
follow a differential weighting whereby some cues are weighted
more strongly than others (e.g., positive or “self-serving” cues are
weighted more strongly than negative or self-detrimental cues)
(Synofzik et al., 2009b). Yet this weighting might not always follow
the rules of an statistical optimal cue integration, namely the
reduction of uncertainty about the self as a cause of sensory input
by giving most weight to the objectively most reliable cues, as
would be suggested by optimal cue integration accounts (Synofzik
et al., 2009b, 2013).
AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES ON THE SENSE OF AGENCY
Based on the above mentioned lines of evidence it is reasonable
to generally assume a tight link between emotions and processes
underlying agency registration. However, current accounts of the
SoA are primarily computational cognitive models, grounded
in constructs of motor control theory, without the need for
emotional states to be taken into account (Wolpert et al.,
1995). Accordingly, the SoA is thought to depend on predic-
tive cues derived from internal forward modeling of upcoming
sensory action consequences in the motor system (Frith et al.,
2000b). Following first critique of these models as accounts
of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a), a growing body of litera-
ture has now started to extend this view by highlighting the
importance of a combination of different cues weighted accord-
ing to their reliability to signal agency (Moore et al., 2009;
Synofzik et al., 2010; Desantis et al., 2012b). Recent models
assume a multifactorial weighting process based on some form
of Bayesian optimal cue integration (Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Synofzik et al., 2009b; Moore and Fletcher, 2012). However,
these models still largely spare out the contribution of emotional
and motivational mechanisms, and only recently has empirical
work begun to explicitly address the affective influences on spe-
cific sensorimotor markers of agency (see also, Synofzik et al.,
2013).
Several emerging levels of evidence point toward the impor-
tance of emotional influences on both functional and dysfunc-
tional agentive processing. A well-studied phenomenon reflecting
the affective influence on agency experience is the “self-serving
bias”. This refers to the pervasive tendency of healthy individuals
to make self-favoring causal attributions when facing significant
positive or negative outcomes (Greenberg et al., 1982; Mezulis
et al., 2004). Specifically, people tend to attribute causes of positive
outcomes more often to internal factors and negative outcomes
more often to external factors. This seems to reflect a mechanism
for maintaining self-esteem and reducing cognitive dissonance
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). Clinically depressed patients typi-
cally exhibit the inverse pattern of this bias, a “depressive attribu-
tional style”, reflected in the internalization of responsibility for
negative events and externalization of agency for positive events
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979).
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This evidence for the existence of self-serving attribution
biases is based on explicit, retrospective self-report, thus indi-
cating that affective modulation occurs on the level of judgment
of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a). These reports are now com-
plemented by recent findings demonstrating that the affective
value of action outcomes already influences also the low-level
sensorimotor representations of actions and agency in a self-
serving way, i.e., the feeling of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a).
For example, it was found that participants’ perception of point-
ing actions is biased towards positive and away from negative
outcomes (Wilke et al., 2012). Other studies observed reduced
temporal binding between actions and consequences signaling
monetary loss (Takahata et al., 2012) or eliciting negative emo-
tional vocalizations (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013). These findings
suggest the existence of automatic valence specific effects of
emotions on implicit low-level measures of the SoA. However,
they also have to be interpreted with caution as—in contrast
to a long-standing assumption—intentional binding does not
necessarily reflect a signature of agency. As we have argued ear-
lier (Synofzik et al., 2009a), the fact that perceived time inter-
vals between movement and effect were decreased by priming
also in case of involuntary movements opens up the possibility
that the binding between movement and effect might not be
specific to agency and intentionality, but can also present—
at least in part—a more unspecific effect linked to temporal
binding between two external events (in this case between the
two congruent sounds, i.e., between prime and effect). Indeed,
recent studies suggest that intentional binding is neither linked
specifically to motor predictive processes (Desantis et al., 2012a;
Hughes et al., 2013) nor to agency (Buehner and Humphreys,
2009; Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al., 2012), but rather to causal-
ity in general. However, even if the phenomenon of binding
of movements to their effects was not specifically linked to
agency, it could still contribute to the experience of agency, for
instance, by accentuating subject’s perception of the temporal
contiguity between movements and their effects (Desantis et al.,
2012a).
Notably, any observed emotional modulation of these
low-level measures of action perception and SoA could in prin-
ciple be mediated by predictive influences as well as postdic-
tive reconstruction of the experience (Synofzik et al., 2013).
Future studies are needed to clearly modulate only one of these
two factors. Alternatively, they could examine valence effects
specifically at the early stages of anticipation and outcome pro-
cessing in order to disentangle predictive and reconstructive
components (e.g., by using the high temporal resolution of
EEG). Predictive cues are assumed to be weighted according
to their reliability to indicate the most likely outcome (Moore
et al., 2009; Synofzik et al., 2010). However, cue weighting
may further be influenced by activated self-motives in a given
social/emotional context. This view is supported by the empir-
ical picture of self-serving biases, which is rather consistent
with respect to the tendency to attribute success to the self
(“positive bias”), but mixed with respect to the tendency to
attribute failure (“negative bias”). It has been argued that this is
due to the “negative bias” being moderated by additional self-
motives such as self-assessment and self-improvement and the
perceived capacity to do so (Duval and Silvia, 2002). Moreover,
the weighting of affective predictions and the perception of
emotional valence of action outcomes could be affected by the
emotional and attentive state of the individual, and may be
critically altered in certain psychopathological conditions marked
by distorted agency experience, which will be addressed in the
following.
EMOTIONS IN AGENCY DISORDERS
Psychopathology research provides abundant evidence for a
strong interrelation between emotion and action, suggest-
ing that aberrant sensorimotor awareness could be rooted
in deficient emotional processing of action-related signals. In
affective disorders, such as mania and depression, action aware-
ness abnormalities are at the core of the phenomenological
expression of these disorders. At explicit levels, self-awareness
is often dramatically altered towards grandiose delusions and
inflated sense of power in periods of mania (Knowles et al.,
2011), or towards a depressive realism in depressive episodes
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979). Previous studies suggest that
already in healthy individuals showing dysphoric compared
to non-dysphoric affective states the experience of self-agency
and self-serving attributions are reduced (Aarts et al., 2006).
Moreover, for depression the possibility has been raised that
impaired action monitoring may represent an important depres-
sive endophenotype (Olvet and Hajcak, 2008; Holmes et al.,
2010), as reflected for example in impaired post-error behav-
ioral adaptation (Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008). The role of
these monitoring abnormalities for the attenuated self-serving
biases in action awareness in these patients, however, remains
unclear.
Another indication for emotional influences on agentive
awareness comes from neurological patients with anosognosia
for hemiplegia (AHP), which can show delusional experience
of self-agency despite a complete lack of voluntary movement
after brain lesion (Feinberg et al., 2000). These patients may
claim that they can move on request or provide excuses (con-
fabulations) for not moving, and some may even believe to
have moved ignoring visual, proprioceptive and external cues
signaling the absence of an action. Besides models assuming
deficits in sensorimotor mechanisms (Heilman et al., 1998;
Frith et al., 2000b; Berti et al., 2005), emotion-related expla-
nations have been put forward, stressing the role of motiva-
tional factors and emotion regulation mechanisms in generating
the unawareness and higher-order confabulations (Vuilleumier,
2004; Turnbull et al., 2005; Fotopoulou, 2010). It has been
noted that transient episodes of improved action awareness in
these patients are accompanied by an increase in depressive
symptoms (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou, 2010).
AHP patients seem to fail to integrate negative emotions with
explicit self-awareness (Fotopoulou et al., 2010). Moreover, recent
evidence shows that negative (but not positive) performance
feedback can cause improved action awareness in these patients
(Besharati et al., submitted). Based on neuroimaging studies
reporting damage in anterior parts of the insula (Berti et al.,
2005; Karnath et al., 2005), it has been argued that a lack of
re-representation of emotional action-related information may
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lead to the abnormally preserved self-agency experience in these
patients (Fotopoulou et al., 2010). It still remains to be explored,
however, to which extent this impairment can explain the vari-
ations in the clinical presentations of AHP including accompa-
nying confabulations and delusional beliefs around agency and
ownership.
Delusions of control in schizophrenia are often seen as the
paradigmatic case of a disrupted SoA, and they have typi-
cally been explained as motor-cognitive phenomena without
relation to emotional and motivational processes (Frith et al.,
2000a). However, these frameworks fail to provide an expla-
nation for the often emotionally tuned semantic content and
context of delusions in schizophrenia, including delusions of
control. Although studies focusing specifically on the thematic
content of delusions of influence in schizophrenia patients are
still missing, studies analyzing delusions in schizophrenia in
general have shown that these refer often not to trivial, non-
emotional actions in daily life (e.g., brushing teeth or typing
on a computer), but to actions and contexts with high affective
and/or moral value, including thematic contents of religion,
sex, grandiosity, persecution, and guilt (Frith, 1992; Linskey,
1994; Suhail, 2003). Here the affective and moral valence gains
major influence on both the sensorimotor and the cognitive
level, such that the action experience and possibly also the
action attribution is altered. Many experimentators so far have
used mainly simplified non-affective actions (e.g., simple joystick
movements (Spence et al., 1997) or simple pointing movements
(Synofzik et al., 2010)) to experimentally test and operationalize
action monitoring deficits, which they then tried to correlated
with the patients’ psychopathology of delusions of controls.
This testing and operationalization strategy should, of course,
not be mistaken as an indicator that the thematic content of
the patients’ psychopathology per se would entail such simple
movements.
AFFECTIVE CODING OF AGENCY: HOW AFFECT MAY
INFLUENCE THE SENSE OF AGENCY
We suggest “Affective Coding of Agency” as an essential exten-
sion of current cue integration models of agency. Emotions
interact with agency in manifold ways, given the different levels
and aspects of emotion representations and the various possi-
ble mechanisms mediating the interplay between emotion and
action awareness. We hypothesize that both the expected and
actual valence of an action outcome act as strong agency cues
in synchrony with cognitive and sensorimotor coding of actions
(Figure 1).
EMOTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF AGENCY
Due to the multifaceted nature of emotions, different com-
ponents of emotions determine agency processing at dif-
ferent stages. Specifically, emotions can influence agency at
the stage of (i) prospective agency; (ii) the immediate feel-
ing of agency; and (iii) the post-hoc judgement of agency
(Figure 2).
1. Prospective affective coding. Emotional and motivational pri-
ors of a subject’s individual state of an action may strongly
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the integration of the affective dimension in
cognitive-sensorimotor mechanisms underlying agentive awareness.
The contribution of emotional cues in synchrony with sensorimotor and
cognitive cues in the formation of sense of agency (SoA) is displayed.
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the influence of distinct emotional
determinants at different stages of agency processing. At the first stage
of action planning, priors derived from affective state, affective trait or
affective context variables influence prospective representations of agency
(prospective affective coding). At the second stage, feelings of agency can
be shaped by rapid appraisal of emotionally salient information and
emotional bodily responses (intermediated affective coding). Thirdly,
positive or negative self-schemas and self-enhancement or self-protection
motives may guide post-hoc explicit attributions of agency (retrospective
affective coding). Finally, individual differences in the degree of emotion
regulation during an affective state (affective style) may moderate the
interplay between emotion and agency at all three levels of representation.
shape prospective representations of agency (for example,
his depressed vs. euphoric mood or his open-minded vs.
buttoned-up attitude; or his positive vs. negative expectation
on the affective outcome of an action; or his high vs. low
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motivation to perform the upcoming action). Also the affective
dimensions of the specific background and context of an action
will prospectively shape the agency experience (for example,
acting in a friendly vs. hostile environment). This prospective
process can be called “prospective affective coding” of agency
(Figure 2).
2. Immediate affective coding. Fast and automatic emotion pro-
cesses (LeDoux, 1996) are reflected in immediate emotional
bodily responses and early mechanisms of sensory gating based
on internal bodily and motivational states (Vuilleumier, 2005;
Pourtois et al., 2013). They may construe the immediate pre-
reflective feeling of the action (Seth et al., 2011; Synofzik
et al., 2013) which is neither fully determined by affective
priors nor by the affective post-hoc evaluation of the action.
Interindividual differences in interoceptive sensitivity may be
an important mediator at this level. This immediate shaping of
agency by direct affective processes can be called “immediate
affective coding” of agency (Figure 2).
3. Retrospective affective coding. At the stage of the post-hoc
evaluation of an action (which might also often occur in rather
immediate and automatic manner in everyday life), agency
is shaped by the affective appraisal of the actual action out-
come (Wilke et al., 2012). Also individual attributional styles
as implied by the depressive realism hypothesis (Alloy and
Abramson, 1979) and situational self-schema and self-motive
activation may influence these post-hoc judgments about self-
agency (Aarts et al., 2006). This affective post-hoc shaping
of agency can be called “retrospective affective coding” of
agency.
Some affective factors might present general determinants of
agency and run across all three different stages of affective agency
shaping, modulating all three of them. One of these general
determinants might be individual differences in “affective style”,
that is, the tendency for regulating emotions. Strategies of behav-
ioral re-adjustments, affect suppression or tolerance could also
be important general mediators of affective coding of agency.
For example, a core feature of depersonalization disorder, self-
detachment including a lowered SoA, has been proposed to result
from a “shutting down” of emotional responses due increased
fronto-insula/limbic inhibitory regulation (Sierra and Berrios,
1998; Phillips et al., 2001).
CONCLUSION
Bringing the affective quality of actions into the empirical pic-
ture will provide an important extension to current theoretical
accounts of agency experience, and will do justice to the individ-
ual differences and pathologies in feelings of self-control. Why do
some people have immediate feelings of self-efficacy and others
do not when facing the same outcomes? And how deep-rooted are
these feelings in embodied social knowledge and actual behavior
towards the environment? Self-motives may find their way into
an embodied signature by shaping the weight of our predictive
codes and the gates through which we perceive the external world.
For example, most recent conceptualizations of predictive models
hold that the influence of prediction on perception critically
depends on the assignment of salience based on dopaminergic
neuromodulation of attentional processes (Friston et al., 2012).
The degree of self-serving affective biases in agentive aware-
ness may respectively depend on increased attentional resources
directed to expected favorable outcomes compared to unfavor-
able outcomes. For example, one way to regulate emotion or to
maximize positivity of the self-concept is through selective with-
drawal of attention to unexpected unfavorable outcomes during
self-action leading to attenuated outcome salience and reduced
belief updating for unfavorable self-generated events. However,
the precise nature of salience-weighted perceptual inference in
relation to emotions will have to be specified in considerable more
detail to understand its contribution to agentive self-awareness.
A systematic investigation of discrete aspects of affective pro-
cesses and emotional regulation strategies could prove a promis-
ing avenue in this direction. Importantly, the relation between
emotion and agency is bi-directional rather than uni-directional
and the concurrent investigation of reciprocal relations between
emotion and action awareness at the neural and cognitive level
will be the challenge for future investigations.
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